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ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE NEUTRALITY AND
THE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
REQUIREMENT
By David E. Wheeler*
Introduction
The Civil Rights Act of 19641 was amended in 1972 to require an
employer to "reasonably accommodate" his employees' religious needs
unless such accomodation would impose an "undue hardship" on the
employer's business.2 Many workers have taken advantage of this provision
to obtain an exemption from a job-related rule that would in some way force
them to violate their religious conscience. The reasonable accommodation
requirement has most often been applied where the tenets of an employee's
religion prevent him from accepting Saturday work assignments. By com-
pelling an employer to "reasonably accommodate" such religious practices,
e.g., to allow the employee to take Saturdays off, the 1972 amendment
alleviated the need for the employee to choose between job and religion
when a conflict arose. Critics of the accommodation rule, however, per-
ceived the amendment as preferential treatment of some employees on the
* Member, third year class.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975). See generally Edwards & Kaplan, Religious
Discrimination and the Role of Arbitration Under Title VII, 69 MICH. L. REV. 599 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Edwards & Kaplan]; Wolkinson, Title VIIand the Religious Employee: The
Neglected Duty of Accommodation, 30 ARB. J. (N.S.) 89 (1975); Note, Title VIi-Religious
Discrimination-Employer's Duty to "Reasonably Accommodate" Employee's Religious Prac-
tices, 9 CREIGHTON L. REV. 795 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Employer's Duty]; Comment,
Religious Discrimination in Employment: Striking the Delicate Balance, 80 DICK. L. REV. 717
(1976); Note, Religious Discrimination in Employment: The 1972 Amendment-A Perspective, 3
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 327 (1975); Note, Title VII: An Employer's View of Religious Discrimina-
tion Since the 1972 Amendment, 7 LoY. CHI. L.J. 97 (1976); Note, Is Title VII's Reasonable
Accommodations Requirement a Law "Respecting an Establishment of Religion"?, 51 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 481 (1976); Comment, Religious Observance and Discrimination in Employment, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1019 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Religious Observance]; Note, Title VII
Standards of "Reasonable Accommodation" and "Undue Hardship" Are Constitutional, but
Recent Cases Illustrate Judicial Overzealousness in Enforcement, 54 TEX. L. REv. 616 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Title VII Standards]; Note, Accommodation of an Employee's Religious
Practices Under Title VII, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 867; 3 CUM.-SAM. L. REV. 497 (1972); 45 FORDHAM
L. REV. 967 (1977); 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 143 (1976); 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1147 (1969); 62 VA.
L. REV. 237 (1976); 16 WAYNE L. REV. 327 (1969).
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basis of religion; the requirement has thus been challenged as violative of
the First Amendment's establishment clause.
3
In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,' the United States Supreme
Court, in a 7-2 decision, narrowly construed the reasonable accommodation
requirement. Larry Hardison, a TWA employee, was required to work
Saturdays because of the operation of a seniority system provision in a
collective bargaining agreement between TWA and the local union. The
Court held that the duty of reasonable accommodation did not require TWA
to vary the seniority system to allow Hardison Saturdays off.5 This holding
was based on the argument that unequal treatment of a religious minority
was not required by Title VII. Specifically, the Court concluded that
Congress never intended that an employer deny the shift preferences of
some employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights under a
union agreement, in order to accommodate the religious needs of other
employees. 6 The Court also held that the "undue hardship" factor of the
reasonable accommodation equation means that an employer is not required
to bear anything greater than a de minimus cost in order toaccommodate?
This holding was similarly grounded on the rationale that incurring signifi-
cant costs to accommodate an employee would entail preferential treatment
for certain persons on the basis of religion. Use of such reasoning-that
Title VII does not require privileged treatment for some religious employ-
ees--enabled the Court to resolve the case without addressing the establish-
ment clause issue.
8
The establishment clause questions raised by the reasonable accommo-
dation requirement had been examined in 1975 by the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit in Cummins v. Parker Seal Co. 9 This opinion remains the
only significant evaluation of the establishment clause issue. The majority
upheld the accommodation requirement by applying the establishment
clause test developed chiefly in the context of government aid to parochial
schools. The dissent argued that the accommodation rule did violate the
establishment clause. The theme of the dissent's argument was that the
reasonable accommodation requirement does not treat religious and non-
3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977).
5. Id. at 2274-76.
6. Id. at 2275.
7. Id. at 2277.
8. To the extent that the accommodation requirement affords preferential treatment for
religious minorities, see id. at 2270, 2275, the Court may have been influenced by the current
issue of the constitutionality of preferential treatment for racial minorities. See Bakke v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert.
granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (special medical school admissions program for
members of racial minorities violates the equal protection clause).




religious persons neutrally. Considering Cummins on a writ of certiorari,
the Supreme Court was equally divided," thus indicating that it was appar-
ently unable or unwilling to settle the difficult establishment clause issue.
Against this background, the Hardison Court construed the accommodation
rule to prohibit preferential treatment of some religious persons. It thereby
nullified the contention that the rule is non-neutral because it favors the
religious over the non-religious.
The thesis of this note is that the Supreme Court need not have been so
inflexibly neutral in Hardison, and that the statutory reasonable accommo-
dation requirement can be upheld against any future establishment clause
attack by applying the principles of a more benevolent neutrality. The note
first traces the statutory development of the reasonable accommodation
requirement. The pertinent establishment clause law is then set out, with an
emphasis on the neutrality theory. Next, the Cummins case is discussed in
order to highlight the establishment clause issue and the constitutional
analysis that was applied by the Sixth Circuit; Hardison is examined with
particular attention given to the Supreme Court's opinion. These cases are
then analyzed to contrast the two major approaches to establishment clause
neutrality. In conclusion, the note suggests that the theory of benevolent
neutrality imparts sufficient flexibility to the two religion clauses of the First
Amendment11 for Congress to accommodate the needs of religious employ-
ees without running afoul of the establishment clause.
I. Statutory Development
The foundation for an employee's claim of religious discrimination was
laid in Title V1I12 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA). 13 The key
provision of Title VII makes it illegal for employers to discriminate on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin:
10. Parker Seal Co. v. Cummins, 429 U.S. 65 (1976) (Stevens, J., did not participate).
11. The two religion clauses-the establishment clause and the free exercise clause-are
contained in the first sentence of the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ... U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
12. Equal Employment Opportunities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1447; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6 (1970 & Supp. V
1975). The constitutional basis for the Civil Rights Act is the commerce clause. See, e.g., 110
CONG. REC. 1528 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 603.
With respect to Title VII, this foundation has never been attacked. But the commerce clause
basis for Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1970), of the CRA was upheld in Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964). Justices Douglas and Goldberg urged in Heart of Atlanta Motel that the legislation
should also rest on the Fourteenth Amendment. 379 U.S. at 279, 291 (Douglas & Goldberg, JJ.,
concurring separately). The majority, however, declined to adopt that basis, a decision that
has been commended. See Cooksey, The Role of Law in Equal Employment Opportunity, 7
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. Rev. 417, 422 (1966). The commerce clause foundation of Title VII
could also be upheld on the basis of the "obstruction of commerce" theory of NLRB v. Jones
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It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin .... 14
Although it is generally acknowledged that the primary purpose of Title VII
was to eliminate racial discrimination in employment,15 the other categories
have also been subject to judicial scrutiny.
16
Religion as a prohibited criterion for discrimination' 7 seems to have
been included in Title VII in part because the CRA is modeled on state fair
employment practices legislation, which typically prohibits religious dis-
crimination.18 Such inclusion also reflects a recognition of religious freedom
as a fundamental right in American society. 19 The sparse legislative history
concerning religion20 suggests that the evil Congress intended to remedy
was intentional religious discrimination, resulting from prejudice toward
another based solely on membership in a particular religion.21 Such blatant
religious discrimination was clearly proscribed by the original enactment of
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private
Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amend-
ments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 462 (1974).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
15. See, e.g., Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 599-600; Developments in the Law-
Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1109, 1113-14 (1971). There are many references in the legislative history of the CRA to its
intended remedial effect on racial discrimination. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 18 (1963); 110 CONG. REc. 1517 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); 109 CONG. REC. 3245-49
(1963) (remarks of President Kennedy).
16. E.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (denial of pregnancy benefits
not discrimination on basis of sex); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (refusal to
hire a non-U.S. citizen not discrimination on basis of national origin); Ochoa v. Monsanto Co.,
473 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1973) (company's hiring practices not discrimination on basis of national
origin); Morris v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 387 F. Supp. 1232 (M.D. La. 1975) (hair length regulation
not discrimination on basis of sex).
17. "Religion" differs from the other discriminatory criteria in that it is not immutable.
Unlike race, color, and national origin, which never change, or sex, which usually does not
change, see Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645, 668
(1975), people often change their religiori, either by outright conversion, e.g., Claybaugh v.
Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. I (D. Ore. 1973), or by a growing conviction
within-their present faith, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich.
1969), rev'd, 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'dper curiam by an equally divided court, 402 U.S.
689 (1971).
18. Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 600-02. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 44-1001 (Supp.
1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.030 (1975).
19. Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 602-03; Title VII Standards, supra note 2. at 618
n.9.
20. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 1528-29 (1964). See generally Edwards & Kaplan, supra
note 2, at 600 n.10 and sources cited therein.
21. See Religious Observance, supra note 2, at 1019.
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Title VII. 22 The issue soon arose whether Title VII also protected an
employee who refused to conform to an employer's normal workweek
because of his religious beliefs.
23
Pursuant to its rulemaking authority,24 the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) 2 issued an interpretive ruling in 196626 that
established an affirmative obligation for an employer to accommodate his
employees' religious practices unless such accommodation would cause
"serious inconvenience to the conduct of the business." '27 The EEOC set
forth guidelines to aid the employer in determining the degree of accommo-
dation expected;28 in particular, the employer was permitted to schedule a
regular workweek to which all of his employees were expected to con-
form.
29
In 1967, the EEOC promulgated an amendment 30 to the original
guidelines that changed the degree of difficulty necessary to excuse an
employer's duty to reasonably accommodate from "serious inconvenience"
to "undue hardship" on the operation of the employer's business. 31 The
22. Id. at 1020. See Annot., 22 A.L.R. Fed. 580, 620-23 (1975) (discrimination on basis of
religion per se).
23. See Religious Observance, supra note 2, at 1019-20.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1970).
25. Title VII established the EEOC, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), and gave
it enforcement powers, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See generally Gardner, The
Procedural Steps Of Title VII Of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 ALA. LAW. 80 (1968).
26. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1966) (amended 1967) (31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966)).
27. Id. at § 1605.1(a)(2).
28. Id. at § 1605.1(b)(l)-(4).
29. Id. at § 1605.1(b)(3).
30. "(a) Several complaints filed with the Commission have raised the question whether it
is discrimination on account of religion to discharge or refuse to hire employees who regularly
observe Friday evening and Saturday, or some other day of the week, as the Sabbath or who
observe certain special religious holidays during the year and, as a consequence, do not work on
such days.
"(b) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds, required
by section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes an obligation on the part of the
employer to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employees and pros-
pective employees where such accommodations can be made without undue hardship on the
conduct of the employer's business. Such undue hardship, for example, may exist where the
employee's needed work cannot be performed by another employee of substantially similar
qualifications during the period of absence of the Sabbath observer.
"(c) Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing to hire an employee
or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the employer has the burden of proving that an
undue hardship renders the required accommodations to the religious needs of the employee
unreasonable.
"(d) The Commission will review each case on an individual basis in an effort to seek an
equitable application of these guidelines to the variety of situations which arise due to the
varied religious practices of the American people." 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1976).
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1976).
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prior supplementary guidelines were eliminated32 with the result that the
employer is no longer permitted to avoid accommodation merely by pre-
scribing a regular workweek for his employees. 33 The EEOC did not specify
what accommodation would be "reasonable" or when inconvenience to an
employer becomes "undue" hardship. Perhaps most significantly, the bur-
den of proving that undue hardship would result from the accommodation of
a religious employee was shifted to the employer.
34
The validity of the 1967 guideline was first questioned in Dewey v.
Reynolds Metal Co. 35 Robert Dewey was discharged by Reynolds Metal
when, pursuant to his religious convictions, he refused to work compulsory
Sunday overtime. 36 The district court applied the 1967 guideline and held
that Reynolds Metal had violated Title VII. 3 7 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
reversed. Although Dewey's religious beliefs dictated that he not ask other
employees to work for him on Sundays, 38 the court held that Reynolds Metal
had accommodated Dewey by permitting him to secure a replacement for his
Sunday shifts. 39 Judge Weick contended that the guideline was not consis-
tent with Title VII, since there was no Congressional intent that an employer
be required to accommodate the religious beliefs of his employees. He also
noted that the collective bargaining agreement by which Dewey could be
compelled to work Sundays was uniformly applied to all employees in a
non-discriminatory manner.40 Furthermore, Judge Weick continued, to con-
32. The EEOC reaffirmed its policy of deciding claims on an individual basis. 29 C.F.R. §
1605.1 (d) (1976); see Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'dper
curiam by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
33. Cf., e g. ,.[1973] EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6120 (1973) (EEOC Dec. 70-580) (plant normally
closed on Sundays).
34. 29 C.F.R. 1605.1(c)(1976). The 1966 guideline, with its correlative standard of "seri-
ous inconvenience," was silent on the burden of proof. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(2) (1966)
(amended 1967Y (31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966)). Thus, according to the Administrative Procedure
Act, the burden of proof would be on the employee: "Except as otherwise provided by statute,
the proponent of a[n]. . . order has the burden of proof." 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970). The EEOC
has been criticized for transgressing its authority by shifting the burden of proof to the
employer in the 1967 guideline. Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583, 588 (M.D. Fla. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972). Another criticism is that it is "unreason-
able and impractical to require the complex American business structure to prove why it cannot
gear itself to the 'varied religious practices of the American people.' " Id. at 588-89 (citation
omitted). But see Religious Observance, supra note 2, at 1030.
35. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689
(1971) (Harlan, J., did not participate).
36. Id. at 329. The company's collective bargaining agreement with the UAW permitted it
to require its employees to work overtime when asked. Id.
37. Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 300 F. Supp. 709,714-15 (W.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd, 429
F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). See
generally 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1147 (1969); 16 WAYNE L. REV. 327 (1969).
38. 300 F. Supp. at 711.
39. 429 F.2d at 335. The narrow basis for the decision was that the district court had
erroneously applied the 1967 guideline since Dewey was fired when the 1966 guidelines were
still in effect. Id. at 329-30.
40. Id. at 334.
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strue the Act to compel an accommodation by the employer would raise
"grave constitutional questions" of violation of the establishment clause
since the government is obliged to be "neutral" toward believers and non-
believers.41 The significance of Dewey is twofold. On one hand, the circuit
court in effect confined religious discrimination to intentional discrimina-
tion.4' On the other hand, the court challenged the EEOC's authority to
issue guidelines to administer Title VII's prohibition against religious dis-
crimination. 
43
In 1972, Congress acted to clear up the questions raised by Dewey. By
an amendment to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,44 the
Senate adopted the EEOC's reasonable accommodation rule as the Title VII
definition of religious discrimination: "The term 'religion' includes all as-
pects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 45 The
amendment was introduced from the floor of the Senate by Senator Jennings
Randolph. 6 The gist of his speech was that the amendment was intended to
overrule the Dewey opinion and to make clear that Title VII prohibited
religious discrimination by effect (i.e., discrimination that is the effect of
strict application of a work rule that conflicts with an employee's religious
practices) as well as intentional discrimination.47 This amendment firmly
41. Id. at 334-35. This argument was the first hint of establishment clause difficulty and it
formed the nucleus of the dissenting opinion in Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th
Cir. 1975), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976). See notes 128-33
and accompanying text infra.
42. See, e.g., Employer's Duty, supra note 2, at 798. See generally Edwards & Kaplan,
supra note 2.
43. 429 F.2d at 331 n.1. Two other cases prior to the 1972 amendment came to conflicting
conclusions as to whether the 1967 guideline expressed the will of Congress. Compare Jackson
v. Veri Fresh Poultry, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. La. 1969) with Kettell v. Johnson &
Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
44. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added). Drafted as a definition of
"religion," the amendment operates to define religious discrimination. See B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 185 (student ed. 1976).
46. 118 CONG. REC. 705-06 (1972). Senator Randolph is a Seventh-day Baptist and his
speech is the focal point of analysis of the amendment's legislative history. See Cummins v.
Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 552, 558 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided
court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1116 (5th Cir. 1972); Hardison
v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877, 887 (W.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977). Both Senator Randolph and Senator
Williams felt the amendment was to further rights under the free exercise clause. See 118 CONG.
REC. 705-06 (1972). But cf. 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1147, 1150 (1969) (Title VII does not affirmative-
ly protect free exercise). Senator Williams also thought that the amendment presented no
establishment clause problem. See 118 CONG. REC. 706 (1972).
47. The theoretical basis for legislating to prevent employmentdiscrimination by effect
was laid down in the leading case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs,
the employer had in the past intentionally discriminated against blacks but had stopped after the
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established an employer's duty to accommodate. It did not, however, define
the scope of that duty clearly.
Subsequent to the 1972 amendment, the courts attempted to delineate
the extent of an employer's duty to accommodate. Some courts have held
that the employer must actually attempt some accommodation. 8 As for
undue hardship, the courts usually required that the employer prove more
than mere inconvenience. 49 Undue hardship has been demonstrated when
passage of Title VII The Supreme Court held that the employer was still violating Title VII
because its neutral employment policy had a discriminatory effect on blacks. Id. at 430-31.
The Griggs discrimination-by-effect theory has been acknowledged by the courts in rea-
sonable accommodation cases. See Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 527 F.2d 33, 38 (8th Cir.
1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 551 (6th Cir.
1975), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976); Yott v. North Am.
Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1974); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 468 F.2d
346, 350 (6th Cir. 1972); cf. Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1115 (5th Cir. 1972) (Griggs
discussed, but not used to support EEOC guideline). Contra, Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co.,
521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976). No case, however, has made a
detailed analysis of exactly how and why it applies to religious, as opposed to racial, discrimina-
tion. Undeniably, a neutral work rule requiring employees to work on Saturdays has a dis-
criminatory impact on Saturday Sabbatarians. (A "Sabbatarian" is "one who regards and
keeps the seventh day of the week as holy in conformity with the letter of the decalogue."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1969).) Thus, the rule of Griggs is iniple-
mented by obliging employers to accommodate their employees' religious practices.
The primary argument against applying Griggs to religious discrimination is that Griggs
was directed toward remedying the present discriminatory effects of past intentional racial
discrimination. Therefore, the argument runs, since there is no history of intentional religious
discrimination per se against Saturday Sabbatarians, Griggs does not apply and religious
discrimination should remain narrowly defined as intentional discrimination. See generally
Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 2. A broad reading of Griggs is preferable, however, and
properly subordinates the element of past intentional discrimination to the discrimination by
effect interpretation of Title VII. The courts have so broadened Griggs, the first step being to
apply it to classifications other than race that have been the subject of past intentional
discrimination. E.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86,92 (1973) (national origin); Diaz
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (sex).
The next step has been to apply Griggs to grant relief from de facto discrimination where there
has not been a showing of a history of intentional discrimination by the employer. See Wallace
v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974) (wage garnishment); Gregory v. Litton Systems,
Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) (employment questionnaire that asked for arrest record);
Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 411 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Il. 1976) (policy of not hiring spouse
of hourly employee); Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(wage garnishment). To use Griggs as the theoretical foundation for the reasonable accommo-
dation requirement requires that one further step be taken: considering the discriminatory
effects of present employment practices where there has been no showing of past intentional
discrimination by the employer or by anyone else. This step should be taken, especially since
discrimination is as burdensome to religious minorities as it is to racial minorities. Title VII
Standards, supra note 2, at 625 n.47.
48. See, e.g., Roberts v. Hermitage Cotton Mills, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9589 (D.S.C.),
aff'd, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9596 (4th Cir. 1974); Claybaugh v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co.,
355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973).
49. E.g., Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Serv., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937, 941
(M.D. Ala. 1974); Kettell v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892, 895 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
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the employee's job affected public safety,50 when the employer would have
to bear overtime expense, 51 and when there was a conflict with a collective
bargaining agreement. 52 In short, the emphasis was on undue hardship.
53
The evolution of the reasonable accommodation requirement has on the
whole been marked by increasing sympathy for the plight of workers who
wish to observe their religious practices and keep their jobs. Title VII's
prohibition of religious discrimination was interpreted by the EEOC to mean
that an employer was required, absent undue hardship, to accommodate his
employees' religious needs. After the Dewey decision, which undermined
the validity of the EEOC's interpretation, Congress responded by including
the duty to accommodate in Title VII. But the legitimacy of the accommoda-
tion rule remained unsettled. The next conflict was whether the requirement
violated the First Amendment's establishment clause by giving preferential
treatment to certain religious employees. The context of the accommodation
rule is sharply different from any area in which establishment clause prob-
lems have previously been considered. It is thus necessary to survey the
relevant establishment clause principles before examining how they apply to
the reasonable accommodation requirement.
50. United States v. City of Albuquerque, 423 F. Supp. 591 (D.N.M. 1975), aff'd, 545
F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1976) (firemen); Dixon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 385 F. Supp. 1382 (D.
Neb. 1974) (electrical lineman).
51. E.g., Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 964 (1976). Contra, Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 397 F. Supp. 375, 377 (W.D.
Pa. 1975).
52. E.g., Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1974), aff'din
part and rev'd in part, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977); Dawson v. Mizell,
325 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1971). But see Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 397 F. Supp.
375, 377 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Serv., Inc., 373 F. Supp.
937, 942 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
53. For a more detailed summary of the factors considered by the courts, see Title VII
Standards, supra note 2, at 620-22.
A problem that continued to plague the Sixth Circuit after passage of the 1972 amendment
was whether the 1967 guideline expressed the original intent of Congress. This issue was
important because the Sixth Circuit was deciding cases in which the employee had been fired
before the 1972 amendment. In Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co. (Reid 1), 468 F.2d 346 (6th Cir.
1972), the court held that the 1967 guideline expressed the Congressional intent. Subsequent to
Cummins and on the second Reid appeal, however, a different Sixth Circuit panel decided that
the 1967 guideline did not express the prior intent of Congress in passing the original Title VII.
Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co. (Reid II), 521 F.2d 512,518-19 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 964 (1976). Judges Edwards and Celebrezze, the majority in Reid I, were divided in Reid
1I, with Judge Celebrezze agreeing that the guideline was not consistent and Judge Edwards
dissenting. See generally 22 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 143 (1976).
It appears that the Supreme Court's decision in Hardison has finally settled the issue.
"Mhe [1967] guideline is entitled to some deference, at least sufficient in this case to warrant
our accepting the guideline as a defensible construction of the pre-1972 statute . Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 97 S. Ct. 2264, 2272 n.l 1(1977).
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H. The Establishment Clause
The establishment clause is one of the First Amendment's twin guaran-
tees of religious liberty. 54 The other guarantee is that of the free exercise of
religion. 55 Ideally, the two clauses should work together to ensure religious
freedom. Yet, since both the establishment and free exercise clauses are
"cast in absolute terms," they may conflict if either clause is "expanded to
[its] logical extreme.' '56
Establishment clause issues have most frequently arisen in the context
of government aid to parochial schools57 and religious programs in public
schools. 58 The Supreme Court has also been called upon to decide whether
the establishment clause is violated by Sunday closing laws 59 or by property
tax exemptions for churches. 6° In cases considering challenges to laws on
54. See generally P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1964).
55. "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] .
U.S. CONST. amend. I. See note 11 supra. Note that the free exercise clause is not sufficient
without more to compel a private employer to accommodate his employees' religious practices
because there is no state action infringing upon the employees' religious freedom.
56. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
57. E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426
U.S. 736 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Levitt v.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968); Everson v. Board of Eddc., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
An extended discussion of these cases is beyond the scope of this note. See generally
Giannella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and Sweet of Church-State Entanglement, 1971 Sup.
CT. REV. 147; Kauper, Public Aid for Parochial Schools and Church Colleges: The Lemon,
DiCenso, and Tilton Cases, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 567 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Public Aid];
Kauper, The Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause: Back to Everson?, 25 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 107 (1974); Kirby, Everson to Meek and Roemer: From Separation to Ditente in
Church-State Relations, 5 N.C.L. REV. 563 (1977); Kurland, Politics and the Constitution:
Federal Aid to Parochial Schools, 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 475 (1966); Morgan, The
Establishment Clause and the Sectarian Schools: A Final Installment?, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 57;
Piekarski, Nyquist and Public Aid to Private Education, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 247 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Piekarski]; Zoeteway, Excessive Entanglement: Development of a Guideline for
Assessing Acceptable Church-State Relationships, 3 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 279 (1976); Note,
Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Administrative Aid to Religion, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 1175 (1974); Note, Establishment Clause: No Tuition Grants, No Tax Benefits for Parents
of Nonpublic School Children, 50 WASH. L. REV. 653 (1975); 45 FORDHAm L. REv. 979 (1977).
58. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (released time);
Illinqis ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (released time). For a
definition of "released time," see note 65 infra.
59. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366
U.S. 617 (1961).
60. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See generally Katz, Radiations from
Church Tax Exemption, 1970 Sup. CT. REV. 93 [hereinafter cited as Katz]; Kauper, The Walz
Decision: More on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 69 Mic. L. REV. 179 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Kauper].
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free exercise grounds, the Court has been careful to note that the establish-
ment clause was not violated by granting exemptions from the laws to
protect an individual's religious freedom. 6 1 The converse is also true. In
resolving its establishment clause cases, the Court has endeavored to forge
principles that do not infringe on the free exercise of religion.62 Out of these
cases, a morass of frequently conflicting doctrines has developed. 63 The first
of these, formulated by Justice Black in Everson v. Board of Education,64 is
the separationist or "no-aid-to-religion" theory. 65 But that theory is by now
primarily of historical interest 66 and the Court has turned to the elusive
doctrine of neutrality.
Neutrality, observed the late Justice Harlan, is a "coat of many col-
ors. "67 A precise definition has not been attempted by the Court nor has one
been agreed upon by commentators. 6 Although the term had appeared in
61. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 n.22 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U S. 398,
409 (1963).
62. Cf. Moore, The Supreme Court and the Relationship Between the "Establishment"
and "Free Exercise" Clauses, 42 TEX. L. REV. 142 (1963) (explores the interface between the
two religion clauses).
63. These doctrines have not been clearly defined by the Court; the commentators on the
subject have attempted to weave the doctrinal fabric from threads picked from the Court's
opinions. See notes 64-95, 222-30 and accompanying text infra.
64. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
65. The "no aid to religion" theory derives its name from the following words of Justice
Black: "Neither [a state nor the federal government] can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another." Id. at 15; accord, Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488, 492-93 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 443 (1961); Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948). Notwithstanding such absolute
language, the statute under consideration which, as applied, reimbursed parents of parochial
school children for money spent using public transportation to and from their schools, was
upheld. 330 U.S. at 18. This result has been explained as supported by the "child benefit"
doctrine, which "is the name given to the concept that the state may extend certain welfare aid
to students attending church-related schools in situations where general aid to the parochial
schools themselves would be unconstitutional." La Noue, The Child Benefit Theory Revisited:
Textbooks, Transportation and Medical Care, 13 J. PUB. L. 76,79 (1964); see Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbooks); cf. Piekarski, supra note 57, at 257. The two foundation
cases in the child benefit line are Borden v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 123 So.
655 (1928), and Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930). See La Noue,
supra, at 80-82. The no-aid theory was next used in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203 (1948), by Justice Black to invalidate a "released-time" program whereby children
were released from regular classes to attend religious instruction held in regular school class-
rooms.
66. See, e.g., Public Aid, supra note 57, at 582. In the most recent case dealing with aid to
parochial education, however, Justice Stevens advocated abandoning the current three-prong
establishment clause test and returning to the absolutist no-aid principle of Everson. See
Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593, 2614 (1977) (Stevens, J., separate opinion).
67. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). One may
raise an eyebrow at Justice Harlan's use of a Biblical allusion, see Genesis 37:3 (King James), in
the context of an establishment of religion clause doctrine.
68. Professor Giannella envisions two types of neutrality: (1) a free exercise neutrality that
"permits, and sometimes requires, the state to make special provision for religious interests in
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earlier cases, 69 the Bible-reading case, Abington School District v.
Schempp,70 was the first to fully develop neutrality as a "central canon of
interpretation" of the establishment clause.71 To facilitate application of this
neutrality theory, which will be referred to in this note as absolute neu-
trality,72 Justice Clark fashioned the following test:
If either the purpose or the primary effect of the enactment is
the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment ex-
ceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Con-
stitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the
Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose
and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
73
Applying the test, Justice Clark held that Bible-reading exercises in public
schools violated the establishment clause because the exercises were intend-
ed to be religious in character or, at the least, they used an instrument of
religion.74 The Schempp test was subsequently used in Board of Education
v. Allen 75 to uphold a law providing textbooks for parochial school children
since the law had the secular purpose of furthering educational opportunities
order to relieve them from both direct and indirect burdens placed on the free exercise of
religion by increased governmental regulation," and (2) a political neutrality that aims "to
assure that the establishment clause does not force the categorical exclusion of religious
activities and associations from a scheme of governmental regulation whose secular purposes
justify their inclusion." Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Devel-
opment: Part I. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 518, 519 (1968).
Professor Schwarz takes sharp issue with Giannella's views. See Schwarz, The Nonestablish-
ment Principle: A Reply to Professor Giannella, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1465 (1968). A wholly
different approach is Professor Kurland's "strict neutrality." See note 85 infra. One commen-
tator, struggling to capture the essence of neutrality, gave up and merely defined it by example.
Piekarski, supra note 57, at 262.
69. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
18 (1947). The term "neutral" in the context of the religion clauses has been traced back to an
1870 Ohio trial court opinion, Minor v. Board of Educ. (Super. Ct. of Cincinnati, Feb., 1870)
(published under the title THE BIBLE IN THE COMMON SCHOOLS (1970)). See Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214-15 & n.7 (1963).
70. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
71. Kauper, The Warren Court: Religious Liberty and Church-State Relations, 67 MICH.
L. REv. 269, 281-82 (1968); accord, Katz, supra note 60, at 95.
72. Cf. Note, Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Administrative Aid to
Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1974).
73. 374 U.S. at 222. As a preface to the test, Justice Clark had indicated that the free
exercise and establishment clauses "overlap." Id. The very language of the test reflects the
trade-off between the two clauses. It seems that the concern over the undesirable advancement
of religion is dictated by the establishment clause and that the apprehension of the improper
inhibition of religion is compelled by the free exercise clause. Absolute neutrality bends to
allow breathing room for free religious exercise in the face of a violation of the free exercise
clause; this fact is illustrated by Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), which was decided the
same day as Schempp, and granted a Seventh-day Adventist woman an exemption from a South
Carolina unemployment compensation law. Id. at 407-08. In contrast to the flexibility of the
benevolent neutrality approach, see notes 222-30 and accompanying text infra, it appears that
absolute neutrality softens only if the free exercise clause has first been violated.
74. 374 U.S. at 223-24.
75. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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and there was no evidence that its effect was contrary to that purpose. 76 This
test was also used in Epperson v. Arkansas77 to strike down an "anti-
evolution" law because passage of the law was motivated by the desire to
suppress the teaching of a theory thought by some to deny the divine
creation of man.
78
In Walz v. Tax Commission,79 the Court retreated from the absolute
neutrality of the Schempp secular purpose and effect test and stopped at a
position referred to by Chief Justice Burger as "benevolent neutrality." In
upholding a property tax exemption for religious organizations, Chief Jus-
tice Burger summarized the prior First Amendment decisions:
The general principle [is] that we will not tolerate either govern-
mentally established religion or governmental interference with
religion. Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts
there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent
neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without
sponsorship and without interference.80
The appellant real property owner had challenged a real property tax exemp-
tion for churches and other eleemosynary institutions8 on the basis that it
indirectly compelled him to contribute to religious bodies.8 2 Rejecting this
establishment clause argument, Chief Justice Burger noted that the purpose
of the tax exemption was neither to advance nor to inhibit religion,83 and he
continued by inquiring whether there was an "excessive government en-
tanglement with religion.'"' Relying largely on the long history of granting
tax exemptions to religious organizations, he found no excessive entangle-
ment and concluded that the church tax exemption at issue did not violate
the establishment clause.
85
76. Id. at 243.
77. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
78. 1d. at 109. Justice Fortas, writing for the Court, indicated continuing adherence to the
concept of neutrality. "Government in our democracy . . . must be neutral in matters of
religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy
of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against
another or even against the militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates governmental
neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion." Id. at 103-04
(footnote omitted).
79. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
80. Id. at 669 (emphasis added).
81. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 421(l)(a) (McKinney 1972) (formerly at id. § 420(l)).
82. 397 U.S. at 666-67.
83. Id. at 672.
84. Id. at 674. The portion of the Schempp test that was absent was inquiry into the
primary effect of the law. See Katz, supra note 60, at 98.
85. 397 U.S. at 675-80.
Another version of neutrality is associated with Professor Phillip Kurland and is referred to
as "strict neutrality." See, e.g., Giannella, supra note 68, at 513. Professor Kurland proposed
that "the [free exercise] and [establishment] clauses should be read as a single precept that
government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses
prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden." P.
KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw 18 (1962). Kurland's theory, however, has never been
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The year after the Walz decision, the Court revived the Schempp
absolute neutrality purpose and effect test in Lemon v. Kurtzman86 and
added to it the requirement, taken from Walz, that there must not be
excessive government entanglement with religion.87 The Court in Lemon
applied the test to hold unconstitutional provisions for salary supplements to
nonpublic elementary and secondary school teachers since the ancillary
regulatory schemes involved the state in excessive entanglement with reli-
gion. 88 The next major establishment clause decision, Committee for Public
Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,89 also used this test. Three
types of programs designed to aid education in nonpublic elementary and
secondary schools were at issue: tuition reimbursements for parents, tax
benefits for parents, and maintenance and repair grants for the schools. 90
The Court held that all three had the impermissible effect of advancing
religion by providing financial assistance, directly or indirectly, to the
religious institutions. 91 The three-prong test used by the Nyquist Court is
stated as follows: "[T]he law in question, first, must reflect a clearly secular
legislative purpose, . . . second, must have a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, . . . and, third, must avoid excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion . . *.."9z Since then, the Nyquist test
has been consistently used by the Court to evaluate statutes and programs
designed to aid parochial education.
93
accepted by the Supreme Court as a whole, Note, The Constitutionality of the 1972 Amendment
to Title VII's Exemption forReligious Organizations, 73 MIcH. L. REV. 538, 557 & n. 121 (1975),
or by any other court, Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free
Exercise Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1217, 1235-36. Justice Harlan, however, did accept Kurland's
theory. Compare Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356-61 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
and Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) with Kauper, supra
note 60, at 198. Professor Kurland was "of counsel" on an amicus brief filed in Cummins. Brief
of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists as Amicus Curiae, Parker Seal Co. v.
Cummins, 429 U.S. 65 (1976). One may wonder why he would support the reasonable accom-
modation requirement since it admittedly uses a religious classification to confer a benefit and
thus seems inconsistent with his strict neutrality. A possible answer is found in one of his more
recent articles. "If I were compelled to read the establishment and freedom clauses separately,
I should think that . . . the establishment clause speaks for a ban on assistance, not to
individuals, but to churches." Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the
First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 213, 241 (1973) (emphasis added). It
therefore appears that Professor Kurland perceives the reasonable accommodation rule not as
assistance to churches, but, at most, to individuals.
86. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
87. Id. at 612-13.
88. Id. -at 619-22. Another form of entanglement was recognized in the "divisive political
potential" of the programs. Id. at 622.
89. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
90. Id. at 761-69.
91. Id. at 774-94.
92. ld. at 773 (citations omitted).
93. See Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593, 2599 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works,
426 U.S. 736,748 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,358 (1975); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734, 741 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
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As previously observed, 94 the Nyquist test had its genesis in the
Schempp neutrality theory, which has herein been termed absolute neu-
trality. The absoluteness of the test's application, and of the Court's view of
neutrality, is illustrated by the refusal of the Nyquist Court to accept the
state's argument that the programs should pass constitutional muster be-
cause they were designed to foster the free exercise of religion. 95 The
Cummins and Hardison cases provide further insight into the inflexible
nature of this form of neutrality.
Ml. Reasonable Accommodation and
the Supreme Court
Three reasonable accommodation 96 cases have reached the Supreme
Court since 1970. In each of the first two, an equally divided Court affirmed
an opinion by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. In 1971, the decision was
Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co. ,97 which provided the impetus for the 1972
amendment to Title VII 98 Cummins v. Parker Seal Co. 99 was affirmed in
1976, but since no opinion was written, the statutory and constitutional
issues remained unsettled. The Court's 1977 opinion in Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Hardison °° was the third case; although the Court had been
expected to settle both issues, it spoke only to the statutory issue and left
unresolved the question of whether the reasonable accommodation require-
ment violates the establishment clause.
The initial focus of this section is the Cummins case, which was the
first appellate court decision to discuss the establishment clause issue.
101
Cummins remains the most extensive judicial analysis of that question and
sets the consitutional background for the Hardison case. Hardison is then
discussed to illustrate the Supreme Court's interpretation of the reasonable
602, 612-13 (1971); cf. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472,
479 (1973) (test not explicitly stated). For a succinct summary of the subtle distinctions drawn
by the Court in these cases, see 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 979 (1977).
94. See text accompanying notes 86-92 supra.
95. 413 U.S. at 788-89.
96. For a brief overview of the reasonable accommodation requirement, see notes 45-53
and accompanying text supra.
97. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'dper curiam by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689
(1971).
98. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
99. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65
(1976).
100. 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977).
101. Three district courts, however, had previously upheld the requirement. In Scott v.
Southern Cal. Gas Co., 7 FEP Cases 1030 (C.D. Cal. 1973), the court merely stated that the 1972
amendment did not violate the establishment clause. Id. at 1036. The district court in Hardison
v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877, 887-88 (W.D. Mo. 1974), rev'd in part and aff'd in
part, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977), applied the Nyquist three-prong
establishment clause test. The third challenge was met in Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank,
399 F. Supp. 172 (W.D.N.C. 1975), by applying a free exercise analysis. Id. at 179-80.
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accommodation requirement. The two opinions are then analyzed; first, to
contrast the different interpretations given to the accommodation rule, and
second, to demonstrate how the Cummins dissent's use of the establishment
clause theory of neutrality may have strongly influenced the Hardison
Court's views on the statutory issue. In conclusion, some attention is
directed to how a more flexible use of neutrality might have led to a different
result in Hardison and may still be utilized in future adjudication of the
constitutional issue.
A. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.
In Cummins v. Parker Seal Co. ,102 the facts show that appellant Paul
Cummins had worked for Parker Seal for twelve years when in July, 1970 he
began observing the Saturday Sabbath as a member of the World Wide
Church of God. At first his manager accommodated Cummins' religion by
permitting him not to work Saturdays and having one of his fellow super-
visors cover for him. But in the summer vacation period of 1971, when the
substituting supervisors were working extra overtime while Cummins was
not, they complained to the plant manager. The plant manager insisted that
Cummins start working Saturdays. Cummins refused and was dismissed in
September 1971.103 After following the EEOC administrative procedure, he
filed his complaint of religious discrimination in district court. The court
dismissed his complaint with the conclusory holding that Parker Seal had
made a reasonable accommodation and that any further accommodation
would create an undue hardship.104
Cummins appealed and the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Parker
Seal had not complied with the reasonable accommodation requirement, and
further, that the requirement did not violate the establishment clause. 15 The
court summarized the record and concluded that the major reason for
Cummins' discharge was "the considerable consternation and problems
with the rest of [the Parker Seal] employees who were being required to
work a full shift, [i.e., Cummins'] fellow supervisors resented having to
work on Saturdays while [he] was not forced to do so."0
6
On this basis, the appellate court found no substantial evidence to
support the district court's conclusion that accommodating Cummins would
have imposed an undue hardship. 1°7 The court conceded that employee
discontent may constitute hardship if it is severe enough to produce "chaotic
personnel problems" but held that Parker Seal had not met the burden of
proving that the grumbling of Cummins' fellow supervisors met that stan-
102. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65
(1976).
103. Id. at 545, 547-50.
104. Id. at 545-46 (citing the district court's memorandum opinion).
105. 516 F.2d at 551, 554.




dard. 08 The court noted that undue hardship is "something greater than
hardship" and further that it may be demonstrated by a showing of an
"unreasonable strain" on the employer's business. °9 The court felt that
Parker Seal had not made such a showing, however, since the company had
"lived with the situation" for over a year before Cummins was fired.' 10
Thus by not reasonably accommodating Cummins, Parker Seal was held to
have violated Title VII's prohibition against religious discrimination.I'
The court next grappled with the establishment clause issue. It applied
the three-prong Nyquist establishment clause test: does the reasonable
accommodation requirement have a secular purpose, does it have a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and does it avoid excessive
governmental entanglement with religion?" 2 The majority held on the basis
of this test that the reasonable accommodation requirement did not violate
the First Amendment. 113 The court held that the secular purpose of the
accommodation rule was to prevent discrimination in employment. 114 The
primary effect of the accommodation requirement was held to be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion.' 15 Rather, the practical effect was
seen as preventing employers from enforcing work rules that have a dis-
criminatory effect on certain religious workers. Therefore, the court rea-
soned, the rule operates to guarantee job security. 116 The court thought it
significant that the accommodation requirement did not compel financial
support for religious institutions. 117 The court did, however, admit that
108. Id.
109. Id. at 551.
110. Id. A "more active course of accommodation" could have been taken by Parker Seal
by requiring Cummins to work longer hours on weekdays or Sundays, by reducing his salary to
reflect his shorter workweek, or by ensuring that Cummins substituted for the other supervisors
to even the hours out. 1d. at 550.
111. Id. at 551.
112. Id. at 551-52.
113. Id. at 551-54.
114. Id. at 552. In particular, the court viewed the rule as "designed to put teeth in the
existing prohibition of religious discrimination." Id. But see Yott v. North Am. Rockwell
Corp., 428 F. Supp. 763,766 (C.D. Cal. 1977). The court contrasted such a purpose with the one
that had voided an anti-evolution statute in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). The
impermissible purpose in Epperson, the only case to invalidate a statute solely on basis of
purpose, was suppression of a theory that conflicted with the religious views of some people.
Id. at 107-09. The court also drew support from Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971),
which had upheld against an establishment clause challenge the conscientious objector (CO)
draft exemption by finding that protecting conscientious action is a valid secular purpose.
115. 516 F.2d at 553.
116. Id. This view is shared by Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan. "The purpose and
primary effect of requiring [exemptions from work rules] is the wholly secular one of securing
equal economic opportunity to members of minority religions." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 97 S. Ct. 2264, 2280 n.4 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Brennan).
117. The court cited Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970), as indicating that such support is one of the chief evils to be thwarted
by the establishment clause. 516 F.2d at 553.
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some religious institutions might receive an incidental benefit, such as a
fuller collection plate, by application of the reasonable accommodation
rule.118 The majority then pointed out that the Court in Nyquist had empha-
sized that "a law is not necessarily unconstitutional merely because it
confers incidental or indirect benefits upon religious institutions." 1 19 Thus,
the primary effect of the accommodation rule was viewed as being to
"inhibit discrimination, not to advance religion." 120 The court then applied
the final prong of Nyquist and found that the accommodation requirement
does not foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 121 There
is no governmental surveillance in the sense that had been the fatal defect in
Lemon v. Kurtzman,122 the only contact between government and religion
being a determination in the labor relations context of whether a reasonable
accommodation had been made. 123 The court also thought that any issue of
the validity of the employee's religious practices would not be seriously
disputed and even if the issue did arise there would be no more entangle-
ment than that which occurs in determining whether a church qualifies for a
tax exemption.
124
The court concluded with a comparison to the Sunday closing law
cases125 in which the Supreme Court had held that laws requiring many
businesses to close on Sundays did not violate the establishment clause. 126
The Cummins court noted that Sunday closing laws also accommodated the
religious needs of much of the Christian population. Therefore, the court felt
118. 516 F.2d at 553.
119. Id. (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
771-72 (1973)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 553-54.
122. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); cf. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (loans of instructional
materials and equipment; auxiliary services).
123. 516 F.2d at 553-54.
124. Id. at 554.
125. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366
U.S. 617 (1961).
126. The Supreme Court conceded the religious origins of the laws, see McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431-34, 446-49 (1961), but held that the present purpose and effect of
the closing laws were to provide a uniform day of rest and recreation for everyone, rather than
to aid religion. "After engaging in the close scrutiny demanded of us. . . , we accept the State
Supreme Court's determination that the statutes' present purpose and effect is not to aid
religion but to set aside a day of rest and recreation." Id. at 449. The Court's "close scrutiny,"
however, was focused almost exclusively on the purpose of the statute, and no real thought was
directed to whether there might be any religious effect. Id. at 445-49. Furthermore, regarding
the state supreme court's determination, it should be noted that the state court confined its
establishment clause analysis to a single sentence. McGowan v. State, 220 Md. 117, 122-23, 151
A.2d 156, 159 (1959), aff'd sub nom. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). Professor
Schwarz has commented that Chief Justice Warren's reasoning "all but ignores the pronounced
religious effect [of the laws]." Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause
Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 703 (1968).
[Vol. 4
that those cases supported its ruling on the reasonable accommodation
requirement. 127
Judge Celebrezze's dissent took a different approach than that taken by
the majority opinion. 12 The majority adhered to a straightforward applica-
tion of the three-prong test; the dissent also applied the three-prong test, but
it cloaked its opinion in the theoretical aspects of the establishment
clause. 129 The heart of Judge Celebrezze's argument was that the constitu-
tionally mandated stance of neutrality toward religion was violated by a rule
that gives preferences to certain employees solely on the basis of their
religious beliefs. 130 Applying the Nyquist test, Judge Celebrezze first found
that the non-secular purpose of the rule was to "protect and advance
particular religions." 131 He then contended that the accommodation require-
ment has a non-neutral primary effect in that it discriminates both between
religion and non-religion and among religions.132 As for the entanglement
prong, he noted that resolution of religious employees' complaints would
necessitate inquiry into both the sincerity of the employees' convictions and
the validity of their religious beliefs. 133
Parker Seal appealed to the Supreme Court and certiorari was granted
in March 1976.134 This opportunity for a definitive statutory interpretation
and for a resolution of the establishment clause issue was, however, lost due
to the Court's equally divided two-sentence per curiam affirmance of
Cummins. 1
35
127. 516 F.2d at 554.
128. The dissent was directed entirely toward the establishment clause issue; no views
were expressed on the factual issue.
129. See notes 64-95 and accompanying text supra.
130. This argument is apparently based on Judge Weick's suggestion in Dewey that requir-
ing accommodation would raise "grave constitutional questions of violation of the Establish-
ment Clause" since the government must be neutral in its relations with religious believers and
non-believers. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 334-35 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
131. 516 F.2d at 558 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting). He perceived the purposes relied on by
the majority as preferential treatment on the basis of religion, and rejected them since such
treatment is not required by the free exercise clause. Id. at 556-57.
132. Id. at 558. He thought that the rule's "sole . . . impact . . . is to aid particular
persons on the basis of their religion." Id. at 559.
133. Id. Judge Celebrezze also commented that striking down the "accommodation rule
would not change the law requiring employers to disregard religion in employment decisions."
Id. He pointed out that a Saturday Sabbatarian would still have a claim of religious discrimina-
tion if he could prove that a "similarly situated employee" was not required to work on
Saturdays. Id. at 559-60. If by "similarly situated employee" Judge Celebrezze meant one in
the same job category as the Sabbatarian, he missed the real dilemma-most such employees
would not have the same religious objection to working Saturdays.
134. Parker Seal Co. v. Cummins, 424 U.S. 942 (1976) (mem.).
135. Parker Seal Co. v. Cummins, 429 U.S. 65 (1976) (Stevens, J., did not participate).
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B. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison
A second chance for the Court to decide the statutory and constitutional
issues pertaining to the reasonable accommodation requirement was pre-
sented when the Court granted certiorari in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison13 6 two weeks after it had decided Cummins.137 This time the
Court finally reached the statutory issue, but once again it left the establish-
ment clause issue unsettled.
1. Facts of the Case
Larry Hardison started work in 1967 as a stores clerk in Trans World
Airlines' Kansas City airport maintenance and overhaul facility. The essen-
tial role of Hardison's department required it to operate twenty-four hours a
day throughout the year. TWA had a collective bargaining agreement with
the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (UAM or
the union), and Hardison was subject to a seniority system that was part of
the agreement. 13 8 In 1968 Hardison became interested in the World Wide
Church of God, and began to observe the Saturday Sabbath. This practice at
first presented no serious problem because he had sufficient seniority to
adjust his schedule to avoid having to work Saturdays.
Hardison subsequently transferred to another department and thereby
dropped to second from the bottom on its seniority list. When another
employee went on vacation, Hardison was asked to work on Saturdays.
Although TWA was willing to allow the union to seek a change of shifts for
Hardison, the union would not consent to a violation of the seniority
provision of the collective bargaining agreement. Hardison volunteered to
work a four-day week, but his offer was rejected by TWA. To implement
this plan would have required TWA either to leave Hardison's position
empty, to fill it with a supervisor or an employee from another area, or to
pay premium wages to someone not already assigned*Saturday work. Hardi-
son did not report for work on Saturdays and was fired on grounds of
insubordination. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Hardison
brought an action for injunctive relief in the federal district court for the
136. 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977).
137. The petitions for certiorari of both TWA and the International Association of Machin-
ists and Aerospace Workers, Hardison's employer and union, respectively, were granted on
November 15, 1976. 429 U.S. 958 (1976).
138. The agreement provides in pertinent part: "The principle of seniority shall apply in the
application of this Agreement in all reductions or increases of force, preference of shift
assignment, vacation period selection, in bidding for vacancies or new jobs, and in all promo-
tions, demotions, or transfers involving classifications covered by this Agreement.
"Except as hereafter provided in this paragraph, seniority shall apply in selection of shifts
and days off within a classification within a department." 97 S. Ct. at 2268 n.1 (quoting the
agreement). The employees with the most seniority had first choice for shift assignments and




western district of Missouri, claiming his discharge was religious discrimi-
nation in violation of Title VII.13 9
2. The Lower Courts
The district court held that neither TWA nor the union had violated
Title VII. 140 The court first held that the union, as well as the employer, had
a duty to accommodate' 4' but that the union's only way of accommodating,
waiver of the seniority rules, would impose an undue hardship on the
union. 42 Turning to TWA's responsibility, the court applied the Nyquist
three-prong test and concluded that the accommodation requirement did not
violate the establishment clause. 143 The court then noted that TWA had
accommodated Hardison by meeting with him and agreeing to let the union
look for substitutes. 144 The court finally held that any additional accommo-
dation would have been an undue hardship on TWA. 145
On appeal the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that
TWA had not violated Title VII.146 The circuit court found that the three
possible accommodations rejected by TWA would not have been an undue
hardship. Consistent with the collective bargaining agreement, TWA could
have permitted Hardison to work a four-day week and have filled his
position with another employee already on duty. The court rejected TWA's
139. This statement of facts is taken from the Supreme Court's opinion. Id. at 2268-69.
140. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1974), rev'd in part and
aff'd in part, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977).
141. Id. at 881-82. The issue was raised because the EEOC guideline only gave the
employer the obligation to accommodate. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1976). The court noted that
another portion of Title VII, drafted only in terms of the employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(Supp. V 1975), had been interpreted to apply to unions. See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermak-
ers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919
(1970).
142. The rationale was that "[t]he hardship on employees [due to shifting them out of
seniority] should certainly be considered hardship on the conduct of business, for the
management of employees ... is the chief concern [of a labor union]." 375 F. Supp. at 883.
The court drew additional support from the portion of Title VII that permits bona fide seniority
systems. "[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pur-
suant to a bona fide seniority ... system .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (Supp. V 1975).
For a related decision in which the reviewing court split one way on whether the union had
a duty to accommodate an employee who objected to paying union dues and a different way on
whether the union could invoke the undue hardship defense, see Cooper v. General Dynamics,
533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2972 (1977).
143. The court found the purpose and effect of the accommodation rule to be one of
guaranteeing job security by preventing employers from implementing rules that discriminate in
effect and intent. The court perceived the only government involvement as a judgment by
courts or the EEOC concerning whether an accommodation was made. 375 F. Supp. at 887-88.
144. Id. at 888-89. The record, however, showed that TWA took no part in this search and
that the union itself made no real effort. Id. at 888.
145. Id. at 889-91.
146. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct.
2264 (1977).
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argument that this would create an undue hardship by causing another area
to be short.147 Alternatively, a substitute could easily have been found for
Hardison. 148 TWA contended that since it would be necessary to pay that
employee overtime, this possibility was also an undue hardship. The court
did not agree: "The regulation does not preclude some cost to the employer
any more than it precludes some degree of inconvenience to effect a
reasonable accommodation. " 149 Although apparently willing to accept the
overtime defense if an undue hardship could be shown, the court held that
TWA had not met its burden of proof on the issue. 15o As for the possibility
of varying the seniority system to permit Hardison to exchange shifts, the
court came to no definite conclusion on whether that would be an undue
hardship, since TWA had not sought a variance. 151 The court did observe
that the Supreme Court had not yet settled the proper relationship between
the accommodation rule and bona fide seniority systems. 152 The union's
liability was not challenged on appeal and the court therefore did not rule on
the substantive correctness of the district court's conclusions as to that
issue.153 As dicta, however, the court agreed that in a proper case the union
would also have a duty to accommodate. 154
3. The Supreme Court
a. The majority opinion
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals
against TWA. It therefore did not need to consider the establishment clause
issue or the issue of union liability. 155 The Court framed the issue on appeal
as that of determining the extent of an employer's duty to accommodate a
Sabbatarian employee. 156
Justice White, writing for the Court, first emphasized that Title VII
prohibits discrimination in employment against majorities as well as
147. Id. at 39-40. The court noted that the EEOC had rejected similar arguments. See
[1973] EEOC Dec. (CCH) 16120 (1970) (EEOC Dec. 70-580) (another employee would have to
work a double shift).
148. TWA could either have asked another employee to do a double shift or have asked one
of the two hundred workers who were qualified for the job to come in. 527 F.2d at 40.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 40-41.
151. Id. at 42.
152. Id. at 41. Other courts and the EEOC have required some flexibility in collective
bargaining agreements in order to accommodate. See Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp.,
397 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Drum v. Ware, 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. f'9244 (W.D.N.C. 1974);
[1973] EEOC Dec. (CCH) 16367 (1973) (EEOC Dec. 72-2066); Employer's Duty, supra note 2,
at 813-16. But see Dawson v. Mizell, 325 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va 1971). For an appeal to union
arbitrators to be sensitive to the reasonable accommodation requirement, see Wolkinson, Title
VII and the Religious Employee: The Neglected Duty of Accommodation, 30 ARB. J. (N.s.) 89
(1975).
153. 527 F.2d at 43. See notes 141-42 and accompanying text supra.
154. Id. at 42.
155. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 97 S. Ct. 2264, 2270 & n.5 (1977).
156. Id. at 2268.
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minorities. 157 He reviewed the legislative history and concluded that while
the employer clearly has a statutory obligation to make a reasonable accom-
modation, the extent of the obligation had never been precisely defined by
Congress or the EEOC. 158 Turning to the merits, Justice White accepted the
district court's view that TWA's attempts to find a workable solution for
Hardison's problems were the only accommodations reasonably expected
within the constraints of the seniority system.159 The Court held that, absent
a "clear and express indication from Congress," TWA was not required to
carve out an exception to its seniority system to accommodate Hardison's
religious practices." A significant factor in this ruling was that collective
bargaining is at "the core of our national labor policy.'" 161 Justice White
reasoned that Title VII did not contemplate the unequal treatment involved
in denying another employee his shift preference, "at least in part because
he did not adhere to a religion that observed the Saturday Sabbath," 162 that
would be the inevitable consequence if TWA arranged an involuntary
exchange of shifts in order to give Hardison his Saturdays off. 163
Justice White drew support for his conclusion from the Title VII
provision stating that application of different privileges of employment
pursuant to a "bona fide" seniority system is not unlawful if there is no
intent to discriminate. 164 He incorporated the Court's finding in Internation-
al Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States'65 that the legislative history
of Title VII, in addition to the text of the statute, makes "clear that the
routine application of a bona fide seniority system [is not] unlawful under
Title VII. "166 Therefore, he continued, the operation of a seniority system
that has no discriminatory purpose is not an unlawful employment prac-
tice167 even though it has some discriminatory consequences. 168 Justice
157. Id. at 2270. He cited McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976),
which held that Title VII prohibited discriminatory firing of white employees who, along with a
black employee, allegedly misappropriated goods from their employer. Id. at 280.
158. 97 S. Ct. at 2270-72. He also dismissed much of the reasonable accommodation case
law as providing but little guidance. Id. at 2272 n.10.
159. Id. at 2273. See note 144 and accompanying text supra. The Court also commented
that the seniority system itself was a "significant accommodation" to the religious, as well as
secular, needs of TWA's employees. Id. at 2274.
160. Id. at 2274.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2275.
163. Id. at 2274-75.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (Supp. V 1975). See note 142 supra for the pertinent text of the
statute.
165. 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977).
166. 97 S. Ct. at 2275 (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 97 S. Ct.
1843, 1863 (1977)). The Court supported its point by citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 97
S. Ct. 1885 (1977) (no retroactive seniority for stewardess rehired after she was fired when
married).
167. A missing link in the Court's analytical chain is a finding that TWA's seniority system
was bona fide. The Teamsters case suggests that a seniority system is "bona fide" if it is
currently applied equally to all employees. See 97 S. Ct. at 1865. Justice White's reference to
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White finished this portion of his opinion by reiterating the district court's
finding that TWA's system was not intended to discriminate against reli-
gion.
169
Justice White next considered whether allowing Hardison to work a
four-day week and either replacing him with other personnel or paying
premium wages to a substitute would be an undue hardship. He thought both
such options "would involve costs to TWA, either in the form of lost
efficiency in other jobs or as higher wages." 170 He then made the following
statement: "To require TWA to bear more than a de minimus cost in order
Teamsters in Hardison will probably be read as a tacit assumption that TVA's system was
bona fide.
In Teamsters, the Court drastically restricted the scope of Title VII regarding seniority
systems. The Court rejected the government's argument that a seniority system that per-
petuates past intentional discrimination can never be "bona fide." 97 S. Ct. at 1860-64. As for
systems that perpetuate the effects of discrimination prior to the effective date of Title VII, the
Court bluntly held that they are not unlawful even though they do not grant retroactive
seniority. Id. at 1861-64. Regarding victims of discrimination subsequent to Title VII's effective
date, the Court pointed out that Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), permitted
those individuals to obtain retroactive seniority without attacking the legality of the seniority
system itself. 97 S. Ct. at 1860. The Court then directly addressed the legality of a seniority
system that perpetuates post-Act discrimination and relied on United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,
97 S. Ct. 1885 (1977), which held that such a system is not unlawful if the employee has not filed
a timely charge with the EEOC, as being "largely dispositive of [the] issue." 97 S. Ct. at 1861
n.30. The Court probably relied on the following language from Evans: "A discriminatory act
which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act
which occurred before the statute was passed." United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 97 S. Ct. 1885,
1889 (1977). The Teamsters Court then emphasized that "[s]ection 703(h) [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(h) (Supp. V 1975)] on its face immunizes all bona fide seniority systems, and does not
distinguish between the perpetuation of pre- and post-Act discrimination." 97 S. Ct. at 1861
n.30. In sum, a seniority system that is currently bona fide, i.e., neutral, can not be held
unlawful, regardless of whether it perpetuates earlier discrimination. This position of the Court
in effect overrules a long line of lower court decisions. See id. at 1860 n.28. As for a grant of
retroactive seniority, it can only be given to victims of the continuing impact of post-Act
discrimination. Victims of pre-Act discrimination are accorded no relief.
168. 97 S. Ct. at 2275. The care taken to emphasize that the mere presence of discrimina-
tory consequences is not sufficient to invalidate a seniority system is apparently an attempt to
distinguish the rule of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), which had held a neutral
employment policy that had a discriminatory effect violated Title VII. Id. at 430-31. In
Teamsters, however, the Court pointed out that although the rationale of Griggs might serve to
invalidate a seniority system having a discriminatory effect, the bona fide seniority system
statute in effect immunizes seniority systems from the rule of Griggs. See 97 S. Ct. at 1860-62.
169. 97 S. Ct. at 2276. The Court recognized that Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747 (1976), in its award of retroactive seniority to victims of post-Act discrimination, permitted
the modification of employee expectations arising out of seniority systems, and further recog-
nized that Franks' interpretation of the reasonable accommodation requirement was aimed at
preventing the alteration of other employees' seniority expectations. The Court distinguished
Franks, however, by emphasizing that retroactive seniority was awarded only to remedy past
discrimination and that past discrimination was not evident in Hardison. 97 S. Ct. at 2274 n.12,
2276 n.13.
170. 97 S. Ct. at 2276-77.
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to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship." 17' The reason ten-
dered for such a rule was that it would be "unequal treatment of employees
on the basis of their religion" to incur extra costs for Hardison. 72 The Court
noted that such costs would not likewise be expended to give other employ-
ees a requested day off. As a result, "the privilege of having Saturdays off
would be allocated according to religious beliefs.' 1 73 Recapitulating his
theme, Justice White closed with the observation that Title VII would not be
interpreted to require an employer to discriminate against some employees
in order to permit others to observe their Sabbath. 74
b. The dissent
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, was highly critical of the
majority's conclusions. Justice Marshall read the majority as essentially
holding that
although the EEOC regulations and the Act state that an employer
must make reasonable adjustments in his work demands to take
account of religious observances, [they] don't really mean what
they say. An employer, the Court concludes, need not grant even
the most minor special privilege to religious observers to enable
them to follow their faith.175
This result troubled Justice Marshall as a matter of social policy because it
compelled some workers to make the "cruel choice of surrendering their
religion or their job.' 17 6 Furthermore, as a matter of law, he criticized the
majority for adopting the position expressly rejected by Congress when it
passed the reasonable accommodation amendment in 1972.177
Justice Marshall noted that the Court's opinion characterized each of
the possible accommodations as involving unequal treatment in favor of the
religious employee. His response was that accommodation should not be
rejected simply because of preferential treatment. He pointed out that the
reasonable accommodation rule comes into play only when an employee
seeks an exemption from a neutral work rule with which he could comply
only by compromising his religious beliefs. 178 To grant an exemption will,
by definition, "always result in a privilege being 'allocated according to
religious beliefs.' "179
The dissent attributed much more significance to the legislative history
of the 1972 amendment than did the majority. Specifically, Justice Marshall
171. Id. at 2277.
172. Id.
173. Id. Justice White also commented that incurring extra costs would effectively require
TWA to "finance an additional Saturday" off for a Sabbath-keeping employee. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2278 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176. Id.
177. Id. See notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra.
178. Id.
179. Id. (quoting the majority, id. at 2277).
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argued that the amendment was passed "to make clear that Title VII
requires religious accommodation, even though unequal treatment would
result." 180 He then observed that the Court, by rejecting any accommoda-
tion requiring preferential treatment, followed the Dewey decision "in
direct contravention of Congressional intent."
181
Addressing the establishment clause issue, Justice Marshall found that
"the constitutionality of the statute is not placed in serious doubt simply
because it sometimes requires an exemption from a work rule."1 82 Referring
to a substantial body of free exercise case law, he made the following
observation: "If the State does not establish religion over nonreligion by
excusing religious practitioners from obligations owed the State, I do not see
how the State can be said to establish religion by requiring employers to do
the same with respect to obligations owed the employer."
183
Upon the foregoing premises, Justice Marshall proceeded to attack the
specific points of the majority opinion. He disagreed with the idea that
requiring TWA to do anything more than hold meetings with Hardison and
permit the union steward to look for volunteers for Hardison's shift would
constitute an undue hardship. 184 In his view, the record did not support the
Court's finding that either paying overtime or not securing a replacement
would be more than a de minimus cost.185 Furthermore, he disagreed with
the majority's interpretation of "undue hardship" as being anything "more
than de minimus cost." 186 He also took issue with the Court's flat statement
that there were no volunteers to relieve Hardison. 187 He then discussed two
other options open to TWA that would not have violated other employees'
seniority rights, and would not have been an undue hardship. 188 In sum,
Justice Marshall's dissent can be characterized as a more compassionate
interpretation of the reasonable accommodation rule.
180. Id. at 2279 (emphasis added) (interpreting the intent of Senator Randolph).
181. Id. Justice Marshall referred to language in the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Dewey that
had talked of accommodations as discrimination against other employees and amounting to
unequal administration of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. (quoting Dewey v. Reynolds
Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 402
U.S. 689 (1971)).
182. Id. at 2280. He carefully excluded any constitutional questions that might arise if the
statute were construed to require an employer to incur substantial costs to accommodate. Id. at
2279-80, 2281 n.6. The reluctance to venture into this issue speaks an awareness that it would
bring the aid-to-parochial-education decisions, see note 57 supra, to a greater relevance in
determining the constitutionality of the reasonable accommodation rule.
183. 97 S. Ct. at 2280.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2281 n.6. For example, it had been stipulated that the additional overtime would
cost only $150 for the three-month period before Hardison could transfer back to his old
department. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2281-82.
188. Id. at 2282-83 & nn. 11-12. TWA could either have paid premium wages to a substitute
and passed the cost on to Hardison or it could have transferred Hardison back to his old




Two key statutory issues are to be considered. The varying construc-
tions of "undue hardship" by the Sixth Circuit in Cummins and by the
Supreme Court in Hardison are first noted; the discussion then turns to the
influence of the seniority system on the result in Hardison.
The different interpretations of "undue hardship" in the two cases
provide a sharp contrast. The Sixth Circuit in Cummins showed a deference
for employees and set forth a strenuous measure for employers to meet.
With respect to the employees' complaints, the court indicated that evidence
of "chaotic personnel problems" would be necessary to establish undue
hardship. 189 Stemming from dicta in Dewey, 190 approved by the EEOC 191
and adhered to by the Sixth Circuit subsequent to Cummins,1 92 this exacting
standard has never been met. 193 And now that Hardison has been decided,
with its interpretation of undue hardship as meaning anything greater than de
minimus costs, 194 it is not likely that the Sixth Circuit's standard will ever
again be followed. The de minimus cost interpretation cuts harshly against
the employee, since an employer is apparently no longer required to expend
much effort to accommodate. In effect, the Court has interpreted "undue"
out of "undue hardship." Since the Court provided no guidelines by which
an employer can judge his compliance with the law, the de minimus cost
construction is vague and will require further adjudication before it is
adequately defined. The two cases taken together evince a significant shift
in emphasis from the rights of religious employees, as seen in Cummins, to
the prerogatives of employers and the other employees who do not request
an accommodation as maintained by the Supreme Court in Hardison.
The presence of the collective bargaining agreement's seniority system
in Hardison presented to the Court a factual situation entirely different from
the one presented by Cummins. It is perhaps the existence of this factor that
189. 516 F.2d at 550.
190. Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam by
an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
191. [1973] EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6310 (1971) (EEOC Dec. 72-0606); [1973] EEOC Dec.
(CCH) 6206 (1970) (EEOC Dec. 71-463).
192. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 521 (6th Cir. 1975).
193. Regardless of the "chaotic personnel problems" standard, the Cummins court's
disposition of employee grumbling as not being undue hardship seems correct. The evidence
indicates that Parker Seal had "lived with" Cummins' Sabbatarian practices for a year because
the other supervisors had not started complaining until the heavy vacation period of July 1971.
516 F.2d at 549, 551. Even then, the complaints were "mild and infrequent," id. at 550, and
arguably would have ceased once the vacation period was over. Furthermore, the supervisors'
complaints were generally not that they had to work extra Saturdays, but were merely that
Cummins was not required to work any Saturdays. Hence, to the extent that the complaints
were grounded on Cummins' Sabbath observances, the circuit court was warranted in finding
the district court's conclusion that there was an undue hardship to be clearly erroneous-
hardship was not imposed on the supervisors by the customary practice of supervising two
departments.
194. See note 171 and accompanying text supra.
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enabled the Court to break its 4-4 deadlock in Cummins and reach a 7-2
decision in Hardison. The Court in Hardison, however, failed adequately
to justify its resolution of the conflict between reasonable accommodation
and seniority systems. Although Justice White held that it would have been
an undue hardship for TWA to have arranged a shift change for Hardison by
breaching the seniority system, 195 he never clearly explained how it would
have been an undue hardship on TWA's business. He instead relied upon the
argument that there was no clear Congressional intent that such an exception
to seniority systems be made. 196 This argument was supported by the
Court's reference to the bona fide seniority system provision of Title VII. 197
While reliance on this provision may properly buttress the Court's conclu-
sion that Title VII does not require TWA to make an exception to its
seniority system, it, does not indicate in what manner varying the seniority
system would have imposed an undue hardship on TWA. The primary
strength of the Court's analysis of the seniority issue may be that the dissent
apparently did not disagree with the majority. 198 In short, the Court's
opinion suggests extreme reluctance to infringe upon collective bargaining
agreements.
The Court's analysis of the statutory issues is important to employers in
ascertaining what they must do to accommodate workers and also to courts
that must decide whether the employer has complied with the accommoda-
tion requirement. For the purposes of this note, however, the statutory
interpretation by the Hardison Court is significant primarily as a foundation
upon which to discuss establishment clause neutrality.
D. Two Approaches to Establishment Clause Neutrality
A discussion of the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Cummins and the Su-
preme Court's Hardison decision is useful to illustrate how the neutrality
theory, as espoused by the Cummins dissent, may have affected the Court's
decision in Hardison. The argument can then be made that the Court's
application of this theory in Hardison was unnecessarily harsh and that the
Court could have avoided such a result by using the precepts of a more
benevolent neutrality. First, the Cummins majority's application of the
Nyquist three-prong test is briefly discussed. The dissent is then examined
to determine what form of "neutrality" it advocated and to show the extent
to which it may have contributed to the result in Hardison. Since the Court
in Hardison did not reach the issue of whether the accommodation rule
violates the establishment clause, its view on that issue can only be inferred.
By construing the statute so as to thwart any accusations that the government
was being non-neutral in favor of religious employees, the Court avoided
the constitutional issue. This treatment of the statutory issue permits the
195. 97 S. Ct. at 2273.
196. See note 160 and accompanying text supra.
197. See notes 164-68 and accompanying text supra.
198. Justice White noted the dissent's lack of disagreement. 97 S. Ct. at 2276 n.14.
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inference that the Court adopted an interpretation of the establishment clause
similar to that taken by the Cummins dissent. The section concludes with a
criticism of this approach and a discussion of the possible application of a
more benevolent form of neutrality to the reasonable accommodation re-
quirement.
The only direct light on the establishment clause issue is shed by the
Sixth Circuit's opinion in Cummins. The Cummins majority simply applied
the Nyquist three-prong test: does the reasonable accommodation require-
ment have a secular purpose, does it have a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, and does it avoid excessive governmental
entanglement with religion? 199 The majority held that the accommodation
rule passed constitutional muster in all three respects. 2°°
An important point in the Cummins majority's evaluation of the effect
of the accommodation requirement is that any financial benefit that accrues
to religious institutions is incidental to the requirement's primary effect of
inhibiting religious discrimination.201 As the court noted, lack of financial
support to religious institutions is very significant. The "child benefit" 20 2
line of cases turned on a finding that financial aid flowed not to religious
schools but to the students (or their parents). 203 In other cases, forms of
financial aid that were ostensibly given to parents of parochial school
children were held invalid because the Court understood the aid as actually
going to the religious institutions. 204 The lesson to be drawn is that there is a
constitutional difference under the establishment clause when the govern-
ment helps a religious individual as opposed to when it aids a religious
organization.20 5 The only arguably "excessive entanglement" revealed by
Cummins is possible inquiry into the validity or sincerity of the individual's
religious beliefs. As the majority observed, most cases do not dispute the
beliefs' validity. 206 And, under existing precedent, 21° inquiry into the valid-
ity of the religious belief is not approved, the only question being the
199. 516 F.2d at 551-52.
200. Id. at 551-54. See notes 113-24 and accompanying text supra.
201. 516 F.2d at 553.
202. See note 65 supra.
203. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (textbooks); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947) (transportation).
204. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,780-85 (1973)
(tuition grants, income tax benefits); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 830-32 (1973) (tuition
reimbursements).
205. See Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172, 180 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
206. But see Cooper v. General Dynamics, 378 F. Supp. 1258, 1262 (N.D. Tex. 1974),
rev'd, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2972 (1977) (questions validity of
refusal to join union).
207. The test for "religion" as developed in the conscientious objector cases requires "[a]
sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that
filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the drafto exemption." United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965); accord, Welsh v. United States, 398 U.t. 333, 339 (1970). See
B. SCHLE1I & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DjscRImiATON LAW 185-87 (student ed. 1976).
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sincerity with which the beliefs are held. 20 8 Although some cases have noted
that an employee is sincere in his beliefs, 2° there has seldom been any
serious discussion of this issue210 and it certainly has not been a greater
problem than the non-fatal inquiry into a conscientious objector's sin-
cerity.
211
The Cummins majority applied the Nyquist test without referring to
any of the establishment clause theories. The dissent also used the Nyquist
test, but it placed primary emphasis on the neutrality principle as "the core
of the First Amendment." 212 The maxim that government must be neutral
toward religion was often repeated, but the dissent did not specify which
type of neutrality it was referring to. It appears, however, that it subscribed
to an inflexible form of neutrality.
There is evidence that the dissent accepted Professor Kurland's strict
neutrality theory. 213 The argument that the rule is non-neutral because it
gives preferences to religious workers corresponds to Professor Kurland's
idea that no classification should be made on the basis of religion. The
dissent also relied on the absolute neutrality theory developed in Abington
School District v. Schempp.214 Such reliance is seen in part by the use of the
Schempp secular purpose and effect test, which is now part of the Nyquist
three-prong test. But there are more telling clues of the absoluteness of the
neutrality evinced by the opinion. The dissent first acknowledged that
Congress thought the accommodation requirement promoted the free exer-
cise of religion215 and then the dissent disclaimed such thinking as a proper
ground for legislation.216 Also, the dissent conceded that the free exercise
clause prevents government from penalizing religion, 217 but it was adamant
against permitting Congress sufficient discretion to legislate in favor of free
exercise values.
By its failure to address the establishment clause issue in Hardison, the
Supreme Court left the question undecided. But the Court's treatment of the
208. Cooper v. General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163, 166 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 2972 (1977) (criticizing the district court's evaluation of validity).
209. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 497 F.2d 128, 129 (5th Cir. 1974);
Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 468 F.2d 346, 348 (6th Cir. 1972); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464
F.2d 1113, 1114 (5th Cir. 1972).
210. But see Hansard v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 5 FEP Cases 707 (E.D. Tex.
1973).
211. The situation that has been referred to as stretching the question of sincerity and
validity to its limit, e.g., an employee who sincerely believes going bowling is central to his
existence, has not arisen. See Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 618. Fear of'a situation of
this sort should not by itself invoke accusations of excessive entanglement.
212. 516 F.2d at 558.
213. See id. at 555 n.1 (citing Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 96 (1962)). See note 85 supra.
214. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). See notes 70-73 and accompanying text supra.
215. 516 F.2d at 556.
216. See id. at 556-58.
217. Id. at 557 & n.5.
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statutory issue does cast some illumination on how the majority of the Court
may have viewed the constitutional question. The primary rationale for
Justice White's rejection of the possible accommodations suggested by the
Court of Appeals was that each would require unequal treatment for certain
employees on the basis of their religion.218 Use of this reasoning enabled the
Court to forestall any charge that the reasonable accommodation require-
ment places the government in the position of being non-neutral in favor of
religion. It is suggested that the Court employed such a tactic because it
understood establishment clause neutrality as having an inflexible nature
resembling in many ways that which was advocated by Judge Celebrezze in
his Cummins dissent.
The Hardison decision is a severe blow to many workers who desire to
practice their religion without being fired. The decision subordinated the
right of these workers to the dictates of a secular collective bargaining
agreement. To the extent that these results grew out of the Court's inflexible
view of the neutrality theory, it is precisely such use of the neutrality
doctrine against which Justice Goldberg warned in his Schempp concurr-
ence:
[U]ntutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to...
results which partake not simply of that noninterference and nonin-
volvement with the religious which the Constitution commands,
but of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a
passive, or even active, hostility to the religious. Such results are
• , . not compelled by the Constitution .... 219
Courts could maintain some semblance of neutrality and yet accommodate
religious employees so as not to be hostile to religion by applying the
benevolent neutrality of Walz v. Tax Commission,220 which has been
termed a "tutored" neutrality designed to set at ease Justice Goldberg's
fears.
221
Benevolent neutrality is rooted in Justice Douglas' majority opinion in
Zorach v. Clauson.22 Under this theory, the concern for being absolutely
218. See notes 162-63, 172-73 and accompanying text supra.
219. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring).
220. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
221. Katz, supra note 60, at 104.
222. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). In Zorach, the Court upheld the second released-time-for-
religious-education case that it had considered. Perhaps in large part to counteract the controv-
ersial trend signaled by Justice Black's absolutist no-aid-to-religion theory, see Katz, Freedom
of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 426,426-28 (1953), Justice Douglas penned
these famous lines: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being
... . When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities
by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our
traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public
service to their spiritual needs." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952); accord, Meek
v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 395-96 (1975) (separate opinion of Rehnquist, J.). See Kauper, supra
note 60, at 199; 62 VA. L. REV. 237, 247 n.65.
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neutral need not be compelling. "The constitutional obligation of 'neu-
trality' . . . is not so narrow a channel that the slightest deviation from an
absolutely straight course leads to condemnation. "223 In contrast to absolute
neutrality, which permits a court to make an exception from laws for
religious reasons only if not to make any exception would violate the free
exercise clause, 224 benevolent neutrality allows 'religious accommodations
regardless of whether the free exercise clause would otherwise be vio-
lated. 225 This aspect of benevolent neutrality was perceived, though not
named, by Justice Marshall in his Hardison dissent when he noted that the
"Court has repeatedly found no Establishment Clause problems in exempt-
ing religious observers from state-imposed duties . . . . even when the
exemption was in no way compelled by the Free Exercise Clause . ... 226
A characterization of benevolent neutrality would be one of a broad
area between "what is prohibited by the establishment clause and what is
required in the name of free exercise" within which the legislature has the
flexibility to act in order to favor the policy of free exercise. 227 This concept
223. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan
later modified his view of neutrality so as to adopt the strict neutrality of Professor Kurland.
Compare Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S 333, 358 n.9 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result)
and Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696-97 (1970) (Harlan, J., separate opinion) with
Kauper, supra note 60, at 199-200.
224. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963). Professor Katz observed that discussions of the religion clauses "often [suggest] that
the provision in question is either required by the Free Exercise Clause or forbidden by the
Establishment Clause." Katz, supra note 60, at 104. See note 73 supra.
225. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664 (1970). See notes 227-30 and accompanying text infra.
226. 97 S. Ct. at 2280 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). To support the italicized phrase,
Justice Marshall cited cases referring to three different types of religious exemptions: (1)
exemptions from the draft for conscientious objectors, Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); (2) exemptions consistent with Justice
Harlan's argument that exceptions for Seventh-day Adventists from unemployment laws were
not required by the free exercise clause although the state was permitted to create them,
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); and (3) permissible exemptions
from Sunday closing laws for Sabbatarians, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 520 (1961).
227. Kauper, supra note 60, at 198; see Shetreet, Exemptions and Privileges on Grounds of
Religion and Conscience, 62 Ky. L.J. 377, 420 (1974); cf. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498
F.2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974); Note, Title Vii's Exemption for
Religious Institutions: Constitutionally Required or Constitutionally Forbidden?, 9 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. 124, 141-42 (1975). Thus, benevolent neutrality seems consistent with the thesis
that religious liberty is the contral concern of the First Amendment religion clauses. See
generally P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSrrrTUrIoN (1964); Katz. Freedom of Religion and
State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 426 (1953).
The operation of benevolent neutrality is illustrated by Mr. Justice White's separate
opinion in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 367 (1970). Dissenting from the majority's
extension of the conscientious objector exemption to persons whose views about war were not
necessarily due to religious training, he did not think that confining the exemption to those who
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was described by Professor Katz: "The First Amendment leaves an area
where religious freedom may (but need not) be extended, in the discretion of
Congress and the state legislatures." 22 It is apparently this flexible concept
of neutrality that Chief Justice Burger's phrase "there is room for play in the
joints productive of a benevolent neutrality" 2 2
9 attempted to convey. 230
If the Hardison Court had acknowledged the flexibility provided Con-
gress by this more benevolent form of neutrality, it would not have found it
necessary to construe the accommodation requirement narrowly to avoid the
non-neutral establishment clause arguments. The Court could have adopted
a more lenient interpretation of the accommodation rule and held that TWA
had not demonstrated undue hardship. Since the Court would then have been
required to reach the establishment clause issue, the principles of benevolent
neutrality would also have bolstered a conclusion that the reasonable accom-
modation requirement does not conflict with the establishment clause.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the reasonable accom-
modation requirement in Hardison is an unfortunate blow to religious
freedom. It remains to be seen, however, whether it is, as Justice-Marshall
portrays it, a "fatal blow" to all efforts to accommodate.2'1 The Court's
construction seems to leave reasonable accommodation more a rule of
preference than a requirement. The message to employers now appears to be
that if it is possible for them to accommodate their employees' religious
practices, then they should do so. But apparently they are not expected to try
very hard. Further litigation will be necessary to spell out the parameters of
this reinterpreted reasonable accommodation doctrine. In particular, the
Court's vaguely defined "de minimus cost" rule will have to be applied, as
the undue hardship test has been, on a case-by-case basis. Assuredly, the
establishment clause issue will again be presented. It is submitted that the
courts should handle it by basing their analysis upon the following principle
of benevolent neutrality: the reasonable accommodation requirement is
opposed war solely on the basis of religious training violated the establishment clause. He
considered a possible free exercise basis and, recognizing that the Court had not yet required a
draft exemption, he argued that "[i]t is very likely [the draft exemption] is a recognition by
Congress of free exercise values and its view of desirable or required policy in implementing the
Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 371.
228. W. KATz, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTIT=mONs 75 (1964).
229. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
230. It is not surprising that neutrality is not always given absolute effect. The Court has
long recognized that the protection of the free exercise clause is not absolute. Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (the freedom to believe is absolute, the freedom to act
is not); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (Mormons cannot have more than one
wife). Similarly, where absolute neutrality impedes private choice, one commentator has
observed that it should give way to benevolent neutrality. Note, Establishment Clause Analysis
of Legislative and Administrative Aid to Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1176 & n.7 (1974).
231. 97 S. Ct. at 2278.
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legislation in a discretionary zone between the free exercise and establish-
ment clauses to further the value of religious freedom. Such a principle
would allow courts to be less absolutely neutral toward religion and accord
them sufficient flexibility to require employers to accommodate with sen-
sitivity the religious practices of their employees.
